When Will Civil Society Monitor the State? Evidence from Mali

• In Event: Agents of Accountability: Monitors and Claimants in Accountability Processes

Abstract

Poor local governance is a pervasive problem in many new democracies where state capacity to provide services is weak and democratic accountability mechanisms are constrained. Bottom-up mechanisms to strengthen local government accountability are popular; they aim to empower citizens—whether as individuals, or participants in civil society organizations (CSOs)—through provision of information as well as opportunities to exercise their “voice” and to be involved in policymaking. However, these interventions often fail due to information and power asymmetries between elites and citizens in these contexts. Little is known about how already coordinated groups of citizens—that is, CSOs or associations whose members are engaged in activities outside the state or partisan networks—can use their existing capacity to hold government accountable. While their presence can reduce information asymmetries and facilitate coordination among citizens, their leaders may also be susceptible to government capture. This highlights a key theoretical puzzle regarding which types of CSOs would be most likely to monitor the state: those that have the most capacity and autonomy to do so are also those who could strike the best collusive bargain. To better understand variation in CSO types and how it determines willingness to monitor the government, we carry out a survey experiment with 1,000 CSO leaders from 48 rural and urban communes in Mali. Specifically, we present audio-recorded vignettes to CSO leaders describing a 5-year, performance-based funding program in which a hypothetical mayor misuses public sector funds in year 1. With the help of a training program which provides information about the mayor’s actions and a reporting mechanism to the CSO leader, respondents have a choice to expose this corruption or stay silent. If the CSO chooses to report the bad behavior, it should incentivize the mayor to behave ethically in years 2-5, but this costs the community a performance bonus (awarded annually if the mayor behaves ethically) in year 1. We assign experimental treatments that vary 1) whether the CSO’s access to training and the right to oversee the mayor is permanent or temporary, and 2) whether the CSO’s report is anonymous to assess if these conditions impact leaders’ willingness to sanction the mayor. The first tests whether a CSO is less likely to collude with the mayor when the shock to their bargaining power is short-lived; the second tests whether reducing the costs of future punishment by the mayor can also increase reporting. By experimentally altering the perceived costs and benefits of reporting, these treatments help us understand whether—and for which types of CSOs—low-cost means of altering the incentive environment for civil society monitors might improve government accountability.

Authors

• Jaimie Bleck, University of Notre Dame

• Jessica Gottlieb, University of Houston

• Katrina Kosec, IFPRI