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Knowledge has long been a central variable in the study of mass politics. Misinformation is now also drawing sadly deserved attention. But separating each from ignorance and mere, unconfident belief requires drawing conceptual lines and poses operational challenges. Conceptually, we identify five belief states—knowledge, correct belief, ignorance, incorrect belief, and misinformation—distinguished on the basis of the presence or absence of relevant cognition, the confidence with which that cognition is held, and its correctness or incorrectness. Operationally, we trace expectable relationships between correct, incorrect, and DK responses, on the one hand, and knowledge, misinformation, ignorance, and mere correct or incorrect belief, on the other.
Much in the measurement of both knowledge and misinformation depends on the items deployed. We argue that the near universal multiple-choice format (including true-false as a special case) is inappropriate, inevitably overstating both knowledge and misinformation. Here we urge a superior approach, focused on the respondent’s confidence that given propositions are true or false. Using data from several original surveys, we offer evidence of this approach’s superiority to conventional, multiple choice measures; examine the differences between knowledge and mere correct belief, between misinformation and mere incorrect belief, and between mere belief and ignorance; and, finally, sketch the behavior of knowledge and misinformation (and mere correct and mere incorrect belief), so measured, in relation to participation and choice.