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While some technologies have primarily military applications, many others have extensive uses in the civilian sector. States face incentives to dampen arms races over the military uses without limiting themselves on the civilian side. But the duality of this technology seems to make it difficult for states to reach arms control deals. How does the dual-use nature of technology affect whether states are able to cooperate in limiting military competition? This paper finds that the technology varies along two key dimensions: (1) the relative ease of distinguishing military from civilian uses; and (2) the extent to which the technology integrates with military capabilities. These variables shape the viability of arms control in two ways. First, when it is difficult to distinguish between military and civilian uses, states will need greater amounts of information to track behaviors and more intrusive monitoring to verify compliance. Deals may become more difficult because states will fear revealing security secrets or commercial advantages. Second, for deeply integrated technologies, demonstrating compliance could create new security vulnerabilities by revealing a state’s industrial and scientific potential to field military forces in the future. Empirically, the paper traces out the effect of these mechanisms on patterns of cooperation and competition over various dual-use technologies from 1816 to 2015. The historical results validate our theoretical framework and lend qualified support to the notion that arms control over some emerging technologies may be possible today.