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When weak states ally with great powers, what explains differences in the junior party’s approach to the alliance relationship? Specifically, why do some junior allies proactively coordinate their policy with their senior partner, whereas others distance themselves from their partner?; why do some junior allies comfortably grow more dependent on their senior partner for security, while others pursue their indigenous nuclear or conventional deterrent to reduce their dependence? This paper shows that, empirically, there exist four different types of junior partner behavior, which it calls Cheap-riding, Rescue-compelling, Favor-currying, and Autonomy-seeking, and that the differences in their behavior reflect their strategies to maximize what are often non-institutionalized benefits from their security relationships. The paper examines the empirical distribution of the four strategies among 133 asymmetric alliances formed over the last hundred years and explains the origin of these different strategies. Some of them raise alliance management costs to senior partners such as the United States, including the risk of crisis escalation and “alliance entrapment” – i.e. getting dragged into an unwanted war. By offering a framework for understanding junior allies’ behavior and strategy when they face weakened security commitments from their patron, the paper attempts to clarify under what conditions the United States should maintain deep engagement with its allies.