Signaling Repertoires: Beyond Costly Signaling vs Cheap Talk

• In Event: International Order and Repertoires of Power Politics

Abstract

One of the most important repertoires states develop is a repertoire for signaling. States need to be able to credibly signal their intentions and beliefs, and their alignments, in international politics. How to credibly communicate that state A is a friend, and that state B should not take any action against it, has been a perennial concern of scholars and policymakers. This paper uses the framework of repertoires to put various signaling modes and methods in conversation with one another, in order to better develop a theory of signaling in international politics. States, particularly great powers, have a number of potential instruments within this repertoire; using different sets, sequences, or combinations of these instruments form a large part of the everyday practices of power politics. The repertoire framework allows me to move beyond the cheap talk versus costly signaling division that has characterized the scholarly debate in recent decades. I show the promise of the repertoires framework by tracing signals – from decision to send to observed effect – that the US has sent in its attempt to manage adversarial and alliance relationships since the Cold War.

Author

• Jennifer Spindel, University of New Hampshire