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Strategies of Armed Group Consolidation in the Afghan Civil War, 1989-2001

Sat, October 2, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Why do some groups and movements remain relatively diffuse while some consolidate, and what leads to the success (or failure) of consolidation efforts over time? While a robust body of work focuses on the causes and consequences of group fragmentation, scholarship on the opposite of fragmentation – that is, consolidation – remains sparse. This paper focuses on the conditions that affect the mix of strategies – coercive, competitive, and cooperative – by which power becomes concentrated within a militant movement or across a broader civil war. In particular, we test theoretical hypotheses concerning how territorial control and group permeability can explain the variation in mode of consolidation. We test our theory using time series data on armed group consolidation in Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001. With this novel dataset we compare different quantitative measures of the level of consolidation by leveraging at least two existing indicators of power – whether it becomes more diffuse or concentrated – within a movement and within the broader conflict. We are then able to compare consolidation strategies across both ethnic groups and rebel groups, such as the Taliban, which is predominantly Pashtun, and Jamiat-i-Islami, which is predominantly Tajik. This paper ultimately contributes to the study of armed group dynamics by leveraging a novel theory to explain variation in different modes of consolidation and introducing new data on strategies of consolidation within and across movements in a given conflict.

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