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Electoral Responses to Economic Crises

Fri, October 1, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

How do economic crises affect voter preferences? Do voters shift leftward, to the far right, punish the incumbent, or perhaps further entrench in their prior party allegiances? Anecdotes consistent with these divergent responses are ample, but the extant literature provides little systematic insight on when one type of response is more likely to occur. We address this puzzle by centering on two debates that arise in the aftermath of economic crises: ‘Who is to blame?’ and ‘What should be done?’ We argue that the answers provided to these two debates differ systematically as a function of the identity of the party in power when the crisis erupts. Specifically, we delineate conditions under which different responses are likely to become the focus of the electoral attention. We then test our theory using cross-national panel data at the party-level.

Our findings show that the right-wing bloc performs systematically better in electoral terms than the left after crises. Specifically, the anti-incumbent effects are asymmetric: When the left is in power when a crisis hits, the center-right enjoys a spike in support. But when the center-right oversees the crisis, the left gains slightly but the chief beneficiary is the far right. Utilizing data on pre-election party appeals, we demonstrate that post-crisis gains on the right are most significant when the parties emphasize issues of nationalism, law and order, and to a lesser degree, budget restraint. Using individual-level data, we find that this phenomenon is due to a shift in voters’ support for parties that emphasize these issues rather than a shift in party’s positioning. Our theory and evidence thus show that the electoral impact of economic crises is primarily a shift in voter demand for certain responses more than a change in parties’ supply of policy offerings.

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