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How broad are the contours of the democratic peace? Scholars have found that democracies almost never engage in interstate wars with one another, but they do initiate conflicts short of war, for example, low-level militarized disputes. The existing literature, however, almost entirely focuses on a single conflict behavior, such as war or economic sanctions. This paper offers the first analysis of regime type and the full range of international conflict, which we organize into a “hierarchy of violence” (from least to most violent): economic sanctions, low-level militarized interstate disputes, high-level militarized interstate disputes, support for foreign rebels, and interstate war. Employing this novel framework for thinking about dyadic conflict, we make two arguments. First, when considering international conflict as a whole, democracies are just as likely to engage in hostilities against one another as they are against non-democracies and as non-democracies are against one another. Second, joint democracy channels conflict behavior toward less violent menu options. Norms and institutions steer democratic dyads away from war, rebel aid, and militarized disputes toward economic sanctions. The democratic peace therefore represents the increasingly pacifying effect of joint democracy as states ascend the hierarchy of violence. Democracies are not inherently peaceful and often engage in conflict behaviors that destabilize sister regimes, but they do avoid overt violence. We test our claims through the systematic assessment of cross-national conflict data, modeling states’ involvement in five forms of hostile relations undertaken by states since 1945 as a function of regime type. The results support our argument. The paper has significant implications for understanding the scope, power, and limits of one of the most prominent theories in IR—the democratic peace theory.