Acting Democratically Under Clientelism

• In Event: Realistic Pluralism: What Can We Expect From Elections?

Abstract

In many modern democracies, clientelism—i.e., the particularistic distribution of state resources as an inducement for political support—is an entrenched part of political life, such that parties cannot compete effectively without engaging in at least some particularistic exchanges. Yet despite the explosion of empirical research on this phenomenon, strikingly little attention has been devoted to the difficult normative questions that arise within such contexts. Most scholarly observers hold that clientelism weakens democracy by undermining the ability of voters to choose between parties on the basis of “programmatic” features such as their ideology, policy platform, or performance in office. It follows, then, that clientelism ought to be transcended in favor of programmatic politics. Yet given that no actor can singlehandedly wrest their society from the self-enforcing logic of clientelistic exchange, this observation yields precious little guidance for political actors who must operate within such non-ideal circumstances. In response, this paper develops a normative framework that speaks directly to these dilemmas. On the one hand, it acknowledges the clientelistic reality faced by many political actors, and allows them to compete effectively within systems built on such particularistic exchange. On the other hand, it points beyond those systems as well, directing well-meaning politicians towards tactics and strategies that will ultimately pave the way for more programmatic modes of political competition.

More specifically, we develop three key heuristics for party leaders and other political actors who aim to act ethically and democratically under clientelistic conditions. First, they ought to categorically avoid certain especially destructive tactics, like spreading lies about opponents or conspiratorial attitudes towards the electoral system. Second, they ought to infuse their particularistic exchanges with a programmatic spirit, deploying brokers and other intermediaries not only to distribute rewards and get out the vote, but also to engage in political education and solidarity work. Third and perhaps most importantly, they must use whatever political power they gain to pursue what we call “mutual disarmament.” Rather than either unilaterally disavowing particularistic exchanges while allowing their opponents to continue using them, or unilaterally retaining the use of such tactics while barring opponents from doing the same, they should seek legal and institutional changes that prevent anyone from using political power to distribute particularistic rewards—by protecting ballot secrecy, for instance, or randomizing the distribution of state resources that could otherwise be used as bribes. While such methods are unlikely to destroy deeply-entrenched clientelistic systems at a stroke, we conclude, parties behaving in this way can gradually eliminate the tools of particularistic exchange, and thereby usher in a more responsive, programmatic, and pluralistic democratic culture.

Authors

• Samuel Ely Bagg, Nuffield College

• Udit Bhatia