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Even in the weakest, most war-torn states, remarkably peaceful regions exist. Under what conditions do 'islands of stability' emerge in countries with failing central governments? This project leverages in-depth interviews with local elites in Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia, alongside paired comparisons of similar regions and an extensive, original dataset on governors in these countries, for testing a new theory to explain variation in subnational security provision in fragile states. We posit that the emergence of regions with comparatively high levels of security depends on the presence of locally bounded rulers (BR). Such rulers hail from a dominant local group that is a minority at the national level. This bounds these leaders’ political ambitions within a given province or region. Due to their limited upward mobility, they govern with a long time horizon and can guarantee protection to their population in return for information and support for the regional government. Preliminary results show that during the tenures of BR, regions experience less violent conflict and less armed opposition against the governor. The findings suggest that the careful promotion of regional solutions to insecurity and conflict provides an avenue for more successful international engagement with fragile states.