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How does patience—or lack thereof—affect international politics? Does being willing to sacrifice larger rewards in the future for immediate but smaller rewards make cooperation more difficult? In other words, are long time horizons always conducive to cooperation? A prominent line of argument in the literature cleaves to this notion, but is it actually the case that discounting present rewards in favor of future benefits always leads to less conflict in the sphere of world politics? I argue that when states bargain to achieve desired outcomes, their time horizons—that is, rates of discounting, which can also be thought of as the degree of patience in waiting for future rewards—influence both their preferences over outcomes as well as their bargaining power to achieve those outcomes. Because of this, there exist incentives to misrepresent time horizons and withhold related private information, especially in cases where the signaling state's "signaled" time horizons are incongruous with its true time horizons. The latter can be estimated by receiver states through analyzing the time horizons of constituent domestic units of the signaling state: those of the chief executive, advisors to the chief executive, top decision-making institutions, relevant bureaucracies, and the public (that is, the audience the government in power is accountable to). The key idea here is that not so much that signals sent by a state will be the wrong signals—as in, the sender will not know how to send a long time horizon signal—but rather that the credibility of the signal will be undermined by the internal characteristics of the sender state. These range from the level of the individual to groups, organizations, publics, society, and regime type. Due to the way in which the credibility of a time horizon signal can be undermined by a state’s internal structure, democracies with long time horizons are the most likely to win crises. Both democracies and autocracies with long time horizons are more likely to escalate crises into full-blown wars.