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Political parties rely extensively on their organizations to mobilize voters during election campaigns. One of the means used by organizations to persuade voters, especially in transition countries and new democracies, is electoral clientelism. Earlier research indicates that organizations function as brokers in the clientelistic exchange. However, many studies indicate that party organizations have several components and thus we know very little about which of these have an effect on clientelism. To address this gap in the literature our paper aims to analyze the extent to which the membership rolls, number of territorial branches, leadership change, and the paid staff may increase the use of clientelism at local level. We focus on Romania due to its high documented level of clientelism over the past decades. Our analysis compares the 42 counties to explain the variation in effects. We control for economic factors (GDP per capita, unemployment rate) or socio-demographic variables (education, age, gander) aggregated at county level. Our findings illustrate that the activity of territorial branches and large membership contribute to the level of clientelism. They contribute to the literature by providing supplementary literature about the developed networks of brokers and by showing the limited outreach of individual politicians.