State Party Organizations, Independent Expenditures, and Spending Strategies

• In Event: State & Local Parties in Transition: New Structures, Technologies, and Coalitions

Abstract

How have state party organizations’ electoral spending strategies changed since the Supreme Court’s Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision? When do state parties prioritize supporting candidates directly through campaign contributions versus outside spending? Additionally, how does the spending of organizations affiliated with parties affect formal parties’ electoral spending? Finally, what differences do state campaign finance laws make to the electoral spending activities of state parties? This paper uses an original and detailed classification of spenders, together with data from the National Institute on Money in Politics, the Campaign Finance Institute’s historical database of state campaign finance laws, and other sources to examine these questions.

Formal party committees have been able to make unlimited independent expenditures since the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Colorado Republican Party v. Federal Election Commission. Whether they have done so has depended upon their resources, incentives, and the rules under which they operate. We seek to evaluate state party organizations’ electoral spending strategies across elections to help understand what type of spending parties prioritize (e.g., campaign contributions vs. independent expenditures) and how electoral incentives and rules affect these decisions. For example, states with limits on how much parties can contribute to candidates should see more independent spending by party committees. We find evidence supporting this expectation in Hunt et al. (2020). However, there is still much to explore regarding state parties’ spending strategies, particularly when also considering the strategic spending decisions of groups allied with party organizations. We argue that the increasingly shared incentives and goals of parties and affiliated outside groups—among them gaining or retaining partisan majorities in legislative bodies (Lee 2016)—require a new and more nuanced analysis of the electoral relationship between political parties and interest groups.

While political parties have been relatively consistent in their total independent expenditures in the 2006-2016 election cycles, outside spending by party-affiliated and partisan coalition groups has substantially increased during that period (Hunt et al. 2020). Party-affiliated groups include (1) national party committees involved in state and local races in more than one state and (2) single-state organizations with a substantial portion of their funding coming from a party or party-affiliated organization. Two key examples of party-affiliated groups include the Republican Governors Association and the Democratic Governors Association. Partisan coalitions include independent spending entities that are coalitions comprised of traditionally pro-Democratic and left-leaning organizations or traditionally pro-Republican and conservative organizations. The increased independent spending in state elections by these groups likely provide formal party committees more options in their electoral activities, including ways to adapt to state campaign finance laws and electoral incentives. In this paper, we will examine how the increased outside spending in state elections by party-affiliated groups and party coalitions have affected state party organizations’ electoral spending.

Our dataset includes independent spending in 15 consistent states for the 2006-2016 elections and an additional 11 states for the 2012-2016 election cycles. This data allows for an extensive examination of state parties’ spending and how their spending is related to electoral competition, state laws, and other strategic decisions involving independent spending groups allied with the party. This research project will help expand our understanding of how the extended party network (e.g., Desmarais, La Raja, and Kowal 2015; Koger, Masket, and Noel 2009) aids the formal state party committees’ in their electoral activities. Furthermore, it will provide key insights into how the evolving electoral and campaign finance landscape is affecting state political parties.

Authors

• Jaclyn J. Kettler, Boise State University

• Charles Hunt, Boise State University

• Michael J. Malbin, University at Albany, SUNY

• Brendan Glavin, Campaign Finance Institute

• Keith E. Hamm, Rice University