Iran’s “Halal” Internet, 15 years later

• In Event: Information Technology and Politics; Formal Theory; and American Political Thought Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Information Technology and Politics Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Iran has dealt with the conundrum that the internet has presented since its introduction in Iran in 1992.
On the one hand, the internet was seen as an appropriate technology to obtain for any powerful modern state.
It would lead to economic growth and be a “gift to spread the word of the prophets (Rahimi 2008 43).” On the other, the internet has challenged the theocratic state’s control of public discourse. How can we understand the long-held promise of a “halal” network, the attempt by the Iranian government to create an intranet for its citizens? Its goal is to free Iranian internet users from the harmful effects of global ideas.

The Iranian National Information Network, or SHOMA, is a national information network conceived in 2006 by the Iranian cabinet as part of the fifth Five-Year Plan.
Little work has been done following the development of SHOMA and appears in sources like Wired magazine and Freedom House. Its purpose is threefold: the theocracy’s desire to establish an Internet-e-Paak, or a “pure Internet;” second, it would be an automatic defense against cyber-attacks; and third, the network would be faster and more reliable than what users currently enjoy. How should observers understand this an attempt to develop a network that would be separate from the World Wide Web, and what can we make of the long slog it has undergone without an end in sight? Should Iranian authorities be taken seriously?

Two phenomena complicate these questions. First, it is unclear how successful such an intranet would be considering the level of opaqueness about Iran’s internet. Official reports to the ITU and unofficial estimates vary widely about the level of access and speeds. It is unclear how much control the government has over people’s access during times of crisis when the state would see the control of information as critical.

Second, it appears that Iran conceptualizes the internet in ways like its fellow-members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security-based organization with China in a leadership position. The SCO has been spreading policy recommendations to its members (e.g., Russia, Iran, Pakistan) for controlling speech on the internet. It is not unlikely that it would also as a tool for affecting foreign policy. The much-lambasted “Proud Boys” emails sent to Americans a few short weeks before the elections were meant, like its counterparts from Russia and China, to sway the election. While “dumb mistakes (Bing and Stubbs 2020)” made attribution simple, it singles the Iranian’s state intent not only to direct internet policy for domestic purposes but also as a tool of foreign policy.

This paper will take a mixed-methods approach, using quantitative data to test the degree to which Iranian estimates of internet access have change over time compared to specialists’ estimates. It will also pursue content analysis to determine 1) what official policy is versus the actions taken by the Iranian government and 2) to what degree the SCO is influencing policy planning and implementation.

I argue that the level of sophistication of those designing the Internet-e-Paak may be finally catching up with the ambitions of its policy forebearers. In no small part, this is due to the influence of its authoritarian allies. Understanding how this state has come to see the internet as both an opportunity and danger helps to situate scholarly understanding of other authoritarian states.

Can a state like Iran simply cut itself off from the “World Wide” internet and replace it with something more preferable to the regime? If so, could this have a spillover effect? If so, in places where populist governments have declared an all-out war on “Big Tech” and social media, the rights enshrined by the UNDHR about speech, association, and freedom of thought, among many others, are in question. If more authoritarian states see the internet as a foreign policy tool, it could continue to wreak havoc on global electoral processes.

Author

• Heather L. Katz, Southwestern Oklahoma State University