Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
How do different types of authoritarian rule influence the occurrence of civil war mediations? While previous research has provided valuable insights on how institutional arrangements under various types of authoritarian regimes can influence dynamics of interstate conflicts, scholars have paid less attention on how specific features of an authoritarian regime can affect the way an civil conflict unfolds . Drawing literature on authoritarian regimes, civil-military relations, and civil wars, I develop an theory that focuses on the connection between personal rule, military effectiveness, credible commitment and civil war mediation. The central argument is that personal rule, marked by high level of power concentration under a single individual, is associated with the use of various coup-proofing strategies. While these strategies decreases the probability of military coups and ensure leader survival, they also undermine the military’s fighting and information gathering capacities, preventing the state from conducting effective counterinsurgency campaigns. Unable to eliminate rebel groups, a state under personal rule is more likely to accept mediations. Facing very limited power constraints, a personalist leader is also likely to face credibility issues during negotiations, thereby requiring involvement from external mediators. Using a newly developed cross-section time-varying measure on authoritarian personalism from 1946 to 2010 and data on civil war mediation , this paper contributes to the literature on authoritarianism and civil war dynamics.