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Research debating the effects of power on war has yet to directly consider the impact of proximity. If power declines in distance, then power relations between nations vary at different points on the globe. Claims about the role of parity or preponderance on conflict then really only apply to particular points or regions in the space separating borders or national capitals. We use a formal bargaining model to demonstrate that dyads should be most prone to fight in places where each state’s capabilities, discounted by distance, are in rough parity. We then assess this “effective balance of power” empirically, introducing the directed dyad year location unit-of-analysis to capture the effect of geographic distance on power and the propensity to fight. With roughly 1 × 10^11 observations, it is impractical to construct this dataset. Instead, we use a sampling approach, oversampling rare conflicts and correcting for bias. Results confirm that disputes are most likely in locations where the distance-weighted capabilities of nations are roughly equal.