Dynamic Lobbying: How to Persuade Congress

• In Event: Political Economy of Economic Statecraft

Abstract

How do interest groups decide which member of Congress to target when decisions are made collectively and do lobbying strategies change as legislation advances? Answering these questions is crucial to understanding the role of lobbying in persuasion but scholarly endeavors have been challenged by a lack of systematic observation of lobbying contacts over time and across political actors. I answer these questions using a novel dataset constructed from lobbying reports submitted by lobbyists on behalf of foreign governments regarding their respective free trade agreements with the US over a span of ten years (2003 - 2012). I show that a diverse set of politicians are contacted but the timing and intensity of lobbying contacts vary by politicians' institutional positions as well their predisposed preferences for free trade. More valuable politicians from a lobbying client's perspective are targeted earlier and more often. Opponents of a proposal are intensely targeted right before the content of the trade agreement is finalized and contacts to opposing members are made through aligned lobbyists. The results suggest that lobbying strategies in a collective decision-making context are sophisticated.

Author

• Hye Young You, New York University