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States have increasingly initiated reform of the international investment treaty regime by starting to terminate and renegotiate their bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Both rationalist and bounded rationality approaches have been employed to explain ongoing changes. The current narratives have however overlooked the underlying bargaining dynamic of investment treaty negotiations: without sufficient bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner, a state will not be able to escape old BITs even if they become dissatisfied with them. This paper identifies observable implications of incentives and bargaining power constraints of states in reforming their bilateral investment treaties. Leveraging a new panel dataset on BITs, interaction effects between bargaining power and incentives stemming from rationalist, boundedly rational, and alternative assumptions about states' decision-making are analyzed. It finds that bargaining power in relation to the treaty partner is an important factor underlying decisions to terminate or renegotiate BITs, regardless of why states have decided to do so.