Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Law enforcement is a core task of governments. Yet, governments are not the only actors that provide security. In some contexts, the private security industry employs more than twice as much personnel as public law enforcement. In this paper, I build a theoretical model that sheds light on the incentives of political parties to invest in law enforcement when citizens are able to rely on private alternatives. The model features a continuum of citizens who are differentiated by their ability to earn income through legal means. Citizens choose whether to commit crime and whether to purchase private protection. The level of public spending on the police is determined by either a left- or a right-wing political party. Contrary to the popular wisdom that conservative parties are tough on crime, the model predicts that both left- and right-wing parties may over- and under-invest in policing relative to the social optimum. Parties’ investment decisions ultimately depend on the wealth of society.