The Rise and Fall of Islamic State: Strategic Change in Territorial Control

• In Event: Territory, Boundaries, and Governance

Abstract

This study explores strategic changes in territorial control among conflict actors. We develop a formal game theoretic model that predicts variation in the use of violence in contested territory and the conditions under which violence would be expected when control of territory changes, whereby recruitment plays a key role. A central proposition derived from the game is that the organizational basis of the belligerents, for example ethnic identity, will predict where territorial control and exchange of control is less costly. Using time and place specific reports (from two novel and distinct data sources) of offensives and where battles occur, we map changes in territorial control. Drawing on the PRIO-GRID, we divide Syria into a set of grid cells for which we combine context specific characteristics (e.g. ethnic composition, population, infant mortality). We employ coarsened exact matching and a quasi-experimental design to account for endogeneity issues. Drawing on this design and using our GIS data, we statistically analyze the patterns of territorial control and escalation. We focus in particular on the expansion and decline of the Islamic State (ISIS).

Author

• Scott Gates, PRIO and University of Oslo