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Building on our recent Democratization article (Selçuk and Hekimci 2020), this paper identifies a rising democracy-authoritarianism cleavage during the third wave of autocratization. Around the world, incumbent presidents, prime ministers, and political parties consistently violate democratic norms, practices, and principles. To counter growing authoritarianism, opposition actors often engage in various forms of coordination that include but not limited to nominating joint candidates, running a unified campaign, and establishing an official alliance. As the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage becomes more salient at the expense of pre-existing social cleavages, opposition actors from diverse backgrounds mute their ideological differences and frame their coordination in democratic terms. We demonstrate the presence of this regime cleavage through three illustrative case studies: The United States (presidentialism and two-party system), Turkey (presidentialism and multi-party system), and Hungary (parliamentarism and multi-party system).
In the United States, we observe the democracy-authoritarianism cleavage especially during the 2020 presidential elections, when the Democratic candidate Joe Biden managed to unite the progressive and moderate wings of the party as well as anti-Trump Republicans with the common goal of defeating the perceived threat of authoritarianism. In other words, opposition actors like Bernie Sanders (left), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (left), Barack Obama (center-left), John Kasich (center-right), and the Lincoln Project (center-right) supported Biden’s candidacy to prevent further backsliding in a potential second term of Donald Trump. In Turkey, between 2014 and 2019, opposition parties from secular, pro-Kurdish, nationalist, and Islamist backgrounds coordinated in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. Although their pro-democracy opposition coordination failed to defeat Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the presidential elections and achieve regime change at the national level, the opposition parties undermined the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) parliamentary majorities and won highly contested mayoral races in Istanbul and Ankara. More recently, two prominent figures within the AKP, Ahmet Davutoğlu and Ali Babacan, established new political parties and launched their criticism of the government based on increasing authoritarianism. In Hungary, pro-democracy opposition coordination dates back to the 2014 parliamentary elections, when the Unity Alliance with the participation five political parties from left to center-right ideologies aimed to defeat the incumbent Fidesz and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. More recently, similar to the Turkish example, the opposition parties nominated joint candidates in the name of weakening authoritarianism, which led to an alternation of power in Budapest and other cities held by Fidesz. Amid rising democracy-authoritarianism cleavage, ahead of the 2022 parliamentary elections, anti-authoritarian opposition parties, including the nationalist Jobbik, released a declaration to unite against Fidesz across the country. Through its comparative framework, the paper aims to contribute to the literature on the third wave of autocratization, opposition strategies, and political parties.