Why Democratic Trust Needs Mistrust

• In Event: Between Trust and Contestation

Abstract

Theorists of democratic trust face a persistent challenge: why should strangers who disagree come to trust one another? These theorists often emphasize the need for formal accountability structures and/or a strong public culture to underwrite trust. I build on this work by arguing for a ‘domain-delimited’ definition of democratic trust that incorporates an ethos of ‘cooperative skepticism.’ I begin by articulating the benefits of a domain-specific account of trust. Domain specificity recognizes that trust assumes different forms in different domains. I then make the case for why democratic trust ought to include an ethos of cooperative skepticism. On my account, cooperative skepticism consists of a disposition of vigilance and truth-seeking. When citizens are cooperative skeptics, they do not egotistically pursue their partial interests and goals without regard for others, and they do not treat one another as enemies who ought to be destroyed. Rather, they aim to further the common good together, but care to verify -- charitably -- whether their fellow citizens do in fact act to further the common good. Importantly, cooperative skeptics do not react with glee should they find that their fellow citizens have fallen short. I show that cooperative skepticism can help ensure that trust does not devolve into dangerously blind faith all the while avoiding the perils of distrust. I conclude by outlining concrete safeguards that help facilitate this cooperative skeptic brand of democratic trust.

Author

• Stephanie Ahrens, Princeton University