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When it comes to statebuilding in the wake of civil war, non-Western aims tend to be modest -- essentially a limited set of “order first” policies directed towards places where Western governments prefer to avoid long-term entanglements. While Western and non-Western modalities of foreign-supported statebuilding differ, the fundamental motivation is the same: Limiting the negative externalities to the international system that can emanate from zones of socio-economic and political devastation. We analyze non-western support for post-civil war stabilization efforts (statebuilding) by China, Russia, and major regional powers between 2001 and 2021 in the Greater Middle East. We find that they are often at least as successful as the West at achieving stabilization objectives. We speculate that, in the emergent multipolar era, the choice set for Western policymakers may involve buck-passing on expensive postwar statebuilding tasks, but at the expense of ceding influence over the postwar polity to non-democratic competitors.