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Polarization and Foreign Policy

Sun, October 3, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

How does political polarization influence national welfare when it comes to international politics? This paper explores how the clustering of members of the public into separate groups sharing political preferences with each other, but not with members of other groups, influences political ends on the global stage and pays special attention to the claim that foreign policy swings from one administration to another worsens national welfare. It develops a model in which two states are bargaining in the shadow of an executive transition. After a first round of negotiation, the incumbent leader of one of the two states is replaced by a leader-elect who answers to constituents with diverging preferences. If a deal was previously reached, this new administration has the option to renegotiate the deal after paying a political cost. This model reproduces key beliefs in the literature: dovish tendencies can be exploited and warmongering can undo the beneficial cooperative efforts of predecessors. However, this model also reveals the complexity of tying public preferences to foreign policy decision-making. It shows that, if the incumbent leader answers to a dovish audience, national welfare is maximized by having a successor who answers to a hawkish audience and faces moderate renegotiation costs. Moreover, in the reverse scenario, the efforts of an administration accountable to a hawkish constituency cannot be undermined by a successor elected by dovish voters. National welfare is non-monotonous in both constituency preferences and costs of renegotiation -- all have a Goldilocks moment that maximizes national welfare. States can benefit from domestic polarization as it can favorably shape the strategic calculations of international partners and the welfare of democracies is more resilient to foreign policy swings than previously thought. Some expansions of the model, as well as some empirical implications and illustrations of the model are discussed.

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