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In the last decade, an increasingly active debate has emerged about the political viability of market-based versus non-market-based policies to address climate change. As carbon pricing policies face significant political challenges (Rabe 2018; Raymond 2020), some have argued that alternatives such as renewable portfolio standards or other regulatory standards would be a better policy alternative (e.g., Mildenberger and Stokes 2020; Green 2019). This argument favors non-market approaches for two reasons: (1) they have greater emissions reduction potential, and (2) they have greater potential for public support, in particular through linkages to other economic and social priorities (Bergquist, Mildenberger, and Stokes 2020). The second argument is similar in important ways to a theory that carbon pricing policies became more politically viable when they began to be promoted for their tangible “public benefits” beyond climate change mitigation (Raymond 2019, 2016)—a idea that goes back to Rabe’s (2004) foundational work on the importance of economic development frames in promoting the earliest U.S. state climate policies.
This paper asks how similar the political strategies for promoting market-based versus non-market-based climate policies have been in practice. It undertakes a qualitative content analysis of framing strategies by political actors for two recent climate policies: Ontario’s market-based cap-and-trade program, and Virginia’s non-market based Renewable Portfolio Standard and 100% renewable energy mandate. Relying on contemporary media accounts in both cases, the study documents the relative prevalence of different framing strategies by different types of political actors. It uses the same typology of possible issue frames stressing climate risks versus other benefits or costs of the policy, including potential economic and social benefits or risks from the program. Based on the prominence of “public benefit” arguments for non-market-based climate initiatives like the Green New Deal, the paper’s primary hypothesis is that similar frames are likely to have been deployed for both policy designs, reducing the political importance of the distinction between the two types of policies. This empirical comparison of leading framing strategies for market-based climate policies and their regulatory alternatives offers an important contribution to the larger discussion over communication strategies that increase the political viability of climate policies in general.