Accountability or Representation? Trade-Offs in Electoral Engineering

• In Event: Political Geography, Political Economy, and Representation

Abstract

Does the design of electoral systems entail a choice between political accountability and representation? While a significant body of research in comparative politics and political economy suggests that the choice of electoral institutions entails a steep trade-off between these two fundamental goals of representative democracy, we argue that trade-offs are contingent and can be weak. We clarify our argument using a formal model that combines conflicts between voters over policy and agency problems between voters and politicians under widely used electoral systems, plurality voting and proportional representation. We show that under common conditions - political polarization and certain distributions of voter preferences - the quality of democracy can be equally bad under alternative institutions, even if voters are rational and electoral competition is institutionalized. We label this constellation an electoral sour spot. The model also highlights when electoral institutions matter in line with existing theories. We discuss implications of the argument for empirical research and electoral system design.

Authors

• Michael Becher, IE School of Global and Public Affairs

• Carl Georg Maier