Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This paper develops a formal model relating patterns of public spending to two distinct elements of a system’s political geography: the regional distribution of income and the system’s levels of administrative centralization. Specifically, we build a two-level electoral game in which elections take place simultaneously at the local and national-level. Candidates at all levels must announce a mix of rents, regional transfers, and national-level social spending. The model demonstrates that the voting behavior of an income class (e.g. the rich or the poor) varies greatly depending on whether their region is wealthy or not; and that wealthy voters in poor regions may in fact be responsible for driving up overall public spending, despite resisting broadly targeted social policies. Further, we demonstrate that the redistributive consequences of administrative decentralization depend on a system’s regional income distribution. In particular we show that decentralization should generate higher levels of social spending when the income level of the median voter is homogeneous across regions; while centralization should generate higher social spending when regions are heterogeneous.