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Political Geography and Distributive Politics (Pre-Recorded)

Fri, October 1, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

This paper develops a formal model relating patterns of public spending to two distinct elements of a system’s political geography: the regional distribution of income and the system’s levels of administrative centralization. Specifically, we build a two-level electoral game in which elections take place simultaneously at the local and national-level. Candidates at all levels must announce a mix of rents, regional transfers, and national-level social spending. The model demonstrates that the voting behavior of an income class (e.g. the rich or the poor) varies greatly depending on whether their region is wealthy or not; and that wealthy voters in poor regions may in fact be responsible for driving up overall public spending, despite resisting broadly targeted social policies. Further, we demonstrate that the redistributive consequences of administrative decentralization depend on a system’s regional income distribution. In particular we show that decentralization should generate higher levels of social spending when the income level of the median voter is homogeneous across regions; while centralization should generate higher social spending when regions are heterogeneous.

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