Divided Communities: Polarization, Immigration, and Political Tolerance

• In Event: Conflict and Division in the Public Opinion and Governance of Migration

Abstract

How does polarization in home country affect the social interactions between immigrants in the host country? The conventional wisdom in the immigration literature suggests that the networks with co-nationals in the country of destination provides a “safe haven” for newcomers and facilitates their search for jobs, accommodation, and social connections. However, there is a gap in the literature that the impact of polarization in home country on these everyday interactions between immigrants is understudied. To address this gap, first, we conducted two online survey experiments with Turkish immigrants, because Turkey as a traditionally immigrant-sending country presents an intriguing case with high level of polarization. We also replicated these experiments with immigrant undergraduate students at the University of Toronto to check for how different levels of polarization at country of origin impact the results. Our findings indicate that polarization travels abroad and shapes the social interactions within the immigrant communities – immigrants are less likely to help and engage with new incomers from their country of origin, and less likely to tolerate their political activities if they are not ideologically close.

In the first experiment, each respondent was presented with the Facebook profile of a hypothetical Turkish newcomer. They were asked to assume that this newcomer was introduced to them by one of their acquaintances and he/she contacts them for assistance/guidance about immigration to the country they live in. We designed in total four fake Facebook profiles, and each respondent was presented randomly with one of them. The first fake profile is the baseline profile that does not signal any political ideology or party affiliation. The other three profiles represent a pro-AKP (the incumbent party), a pro-CHP (the main secular opposition party), and a pro-HDP profile (the pro-Kurdish party) stance, respectively. We introduced multiple ideology-signaling heuristics to ensure treatment: the ideological orientations of these hypothetical newcomers are signaled through varying cover photos, district of residence; Facebook likes of different newspapers, TV shows, football clubs, celebrities, cafes, and civil society organizations. In order to measure affective polarization, we asked a battery of questions about respondents' willingness to engage with the newcomer. These questions include to what extent they would share information and help with the necessary procedures for immigration and visa; to what extent they would help her/him to find accommodation in their neighborhood, to find a job, and to what degree they would be willing to meet this newcomer and introduce her/him to their friends and family.

In the second design, each respondent was presented with a hypothetical scenario of a peaceful protest, organized by their co-nationals in the host country. The treatment was randomized based on the respondent's party affiliation: They either received a script with co-nationals supporting the same political party with them, or co-nationals supporting a party that is diametrically opposed against their choice. Then we measured political tolerance towards these demonstrations with a battery of questions. These questions include to what extent each respondent agrees that this group should be allowed to organize demonstrations or make a press release in their city or submit a petition to the host country's parliament; and whether this group's phones may be tapped and recorded for security reasons if necessary or not.

Authors

• Semuhi Sinanoglu, University of Toronto

• Selin Kepenek, University of Toronto