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A large body of literature has argued that higher offensive advantage leads to worse outcomes in the anarchical international system. In this paper, we challenge this prevailing wisdom. We argue that state welfare is u-shaped under increasing offensive advantage (a phenomenon we abbreviate WUO). We construct a formal model of two single unitary actor states coexisting under anarchy that choose their arms levels endogenously and have the option to attack the other side. The first-best outcome in this model involves high levels of defensive advantage such that attacking is difficult and the arms levels required to deter attacks are low. As offensive advantage increases, the arms levels required to deter attacks increases. Eventually, offensive advantage is high enough that attacks cannot be deterred because states prefer the gamble of war to a peace made costly by high arms spending. Using this model, we identify three mechanisms that contribute to WUO: (1) In the peace equilibrium, increasing offensive advantage reduces state welfare because higher arms burdens are required to deter the other side from attacking (2) Increasing offensive advantage to high levels causes wars to be less total and smaller in scale due to lower returns to arms investment (3) Wars tend to be faster and more decisive with higher offensive advantage, which reduces the cost of war. In summary, intermediate offensive advantage is worst because peace is costly and risky and wars are larger, longer, less decisive, and more destructive. When offense is highly advantaged, wars are smaller in scale, more decisive, and less costly. When defense is highly advantaged, peace can be maintained at low cost because wars are easily deterred with low arms levels. We supplement our analysis with historical examples of these mechanisms including in the Warring States periods in China and Japan, Napoleonic Europe, and the Second World War.