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Strategic Closing Off in International Technology Races

Fri, October 1, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

The development of new technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) or genetic engineering can have security consequences and negative externalities. States have an incentive to invest in research and development (R&D) not only for economic benefits but also to reduce these risks. Open development promotes can promote more rapid economic growth but also allows opponents to more quickly develop the technology for military purposes, threatening the state’s security. Thus, the timing and level of closing off of an R&D process is a product of strategic interaction. Drawing on existing literature on public goods provision, arms races, and patent races, this paper presents a dynamic model in which states are investing in risky technologies. The model examines the welfare implications of the timing and level of closing off of an R&D process. The model shows that closing off universally increases the probability that an actor’s adversary will close off development. However, I observe a concave down relationship between closing off and welfare, with early closing off leading to a loss of economic benefits and late closing off increasing the chance that the actor’s adversary will win the technology race. I then test this model empirically using existing government R&D spending data from the IMF.

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