Congress and the Distribution of Benefits During Recessions

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Abstract

Policymaking in the post war Congress has been characterized by particularism. Members of Congress, driven by electoral motivations, seek to provide their constituents with particularistic benefits they can easily claim credit for. Yet we know very little about who Congress has distributed benefits to during economic emergencies such as a recession. This is curious considering economic bad news produced by a recession is by definition widely spread across districts and states. Many legislators as a result have a credit claiming incentive to provide their constituents with aid during such an event.

This paper exploits an original dataset of every bill Congress considered in response to eleven recessions since 1946 to examine who Congress distributed benefits to during recessions in the post war era, how much they distributed, and why. It finds that Congress has for the most part distributed benefits to groups, geographic areas, and the general public when addressing a recession since the early 1960s. Additionally, this paper finds that the magnitude of benefits Congress distributed during the recessions of the 1970s, the 1980s, the 19990s, and the recessions of the 2000s were substantially larger than those Congress distributed when addressing the recessions prior to 1970. This paper also finds that breakdown of the appropriations process in the early 1960s and formal rule changes in Congress in the 1970s that altered the structure of decision-making over fiscal policy and regulatory policy help explain this behavior by Congress.

Author

• Scott Newsome, University of California, Santa Cruz