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Latent Deterrence or Symbolic Retaliation: Revisiting China’s Nuclear Strategy

Fri, October 1, 8:00 to 8:30am PDT (8:00 to 8:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

The recent dynamic literature on nuclear latency has lowered the threshold for nuclear deterrence to work – having a latent capability suffices to deter and increases one’s bargaining power. This paper argues against this new research trend by exploring technological challenges of an effective nuclear deterrent. It finds that deterring nuclear aggression is a capability that only very few nuclear powers have the luxury to have. It then proposes a nuanced concept – a symbolic retaliation capability, which supports a policy goal of counter coercion. This capability is defined by four criteria: a delivery range reaching adversary’s homeland, a credible measure of survivability, de-alerted status and low preparedness, and no detailed operational doctrine. Chinese nuclear strategy exemplifies this new concept. China’s policy goal is not to deter nuclear aggression but to counter coercion from its superpower adversaries during the Cold War. China acquired this capability in the early 1980s with a full-flight test of its first ICMB and by developing a measure of survivability for its missiles. This capability renders nuclear threats upon China meaningless and makes domestic audience psychologically immune to coercive threats. However, Chinese nuclear force is maintained de-alerted and lacks operationality. This new concept carries important policy implications to the interpretation of China’s ongoing nuclear modernization and provides insights to the maintenance of a stable U.S.-China nuclear relationship.

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