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Myanmar has never been so close to peace. After several decades of military rule, it began an inclusive peace process in 2011 and held in 2015 its first free and fair elections since the 1950s. Yet, a decade after the beginning of the transition, the peace process appeared to have "stalled". This paper asks why, despite favorable conditions, was so little accomplished toward a peace agreement? Scholarship on civil wars and peace negotiations views stalled conflict as an equilibrium point, inherently temporary, and likely to move either to a negotiated agreement or a more intensive violent conflict. Based on a book project, this paper argues that manipulating a stalled conflict can be a winning strategy, particularly for the state. We show that, while the peace process appears stalled in Myanmar, the state has attained its goals better than ever before while also reducing the costs of both war and extensive political and economic concessions to ethnic groups. By developing the concept of "winning by process," this paper seeks to theorize a third alternative between "winning by war" and "winning by agreement" that allows us to make sense of seemingly stalled conflict.