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In the aftermath of civil wars, why do some peace agreements succeed while others fail? The existing literature focuses on incentive problems, proposing that they can be solved with external guarantors or the emergence of winning internal coalitions. There has been less attention on how capacity may explain the success or failure of peace processes. Insurgencies that lack organizational capacities are more vulnerable to splintering during the negotiation or implementation of peace agreements, often resulting in splinter groups or recurrent war. In this book project, I argue that the organizational cohesion that insurgent groups have built during wartime helps insurgent leaders to hold governments to their commitments. In turn, cohesion makes insurgent leaders' commitments more credible after war by helping them to ensure compliance of fellow fighters. Insurgent cohesion, therefore, helps both states and insurgents to uphold their commitments, thereby improving the prospects for peace to endure. Insurgent leaders use the internal social and organizational linkages built during wartime to determine how to distribute rents or use coercion to ensure compliance from governments and ensure that fellow insurgents comply with the terms of peace agreements and do not splinter off. Using survey and interview data from the case of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in Indonesia, I test the theory by showing how variation in the internal social and organizational linkages within explain outcomes such as postwar rents and violence. I then compare the case of Aceh with the Moro movements of the Southern Philippines.