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Downs’ (1957) cost-benefit analysis of voting showed that it was irrational to vote, and irrational to acquire political information (and by extension, to most forms of political participation, e.g., contributing to a candidate’s campaign) if one’s sole motivation is economic, self-interest. In response, three solutions have been proposed. Voters are motivated by: expressive identification; civic duty; and weak altruism.
I first review and contrast the competing theories from the perspective of testing methodology. I perform non-nested (Vuong and Clarke) tests of the competing theories. Non-nested testing assumes that the competing theories are strictly exclusive, i.e., only one theory is correct. All past tests of the competing theories have been confined to testing one theory at a time. Thus, they are not tested against each other, as competitive explanations. This is the reason that I shift to the non-nested research design.