The Signaling Effect of Censorship in Autocracies

• In Event: Repression and Censorship

Abstract

Censorship is one of the most effective tools for autocrats to control information and manipulate public opinion. Despite the growing attention to the strategic use of censorship in authoritarian regimes, most scholarly work focuses on the blocking effect of censorship — censorship blocks negative news or mobilization information and reduces the likelihood of collective action against the regime. This study argues that censorship not only stops information but also conveys information about the state’s capacity by signaling through the act of censorship itself, which can be defined as the signaling effect of censorship. Comprehensive censorship of social media incurs substantive economic and informational costs and requires firm control over the social media platforms. The costly censorship helps distinguish strong authoritarian regimes from weaker ones with the financial, political, and informational costs it requires, and therefore deters potential challengers from rebellion.

To test the signaling model of censorship, the study develops an innovative experimental design that creates an authoritarian political environment with a hypothetical firm. In this hypothetical firm, the asymmetry of power and the culture of obedience embedded in the management-employee relationship subject employees to the authoritarian rule of the management, which resembles the state-citizen relationship in authoritarian regimes where citizens are subject to authoritarian authority. In this experiment, an evaluation report with negative comments about the manager represents negative news in reality, and the forced withdrawal of the report by the manager resembles censorship. A total of 280 subjects were recruited from a large public research university in the US were randomly assigned into one of the four groups created by a 2x2 factorial design with negative news and censorship as the two treatments.

The results of the experiment support the signaling effect of censorship. People who encounter censorship perceive the authority to be more powerful and are less likely to revolt against it. Participants are also less likely to mobilize others to revolt after encountering censorship. However, this signaling effect is only present when participants are informed of censored negative information. The revelation of censored negative news confirms that the act of information blocking is an act of censorship and strengthens the signal by eliminating citizens’ uncertainty about the nature of the information blocking and reduces the chance of misinterpreting the signal.

This study offers a new perspective on the function of censorship and demonstrates that censorship not only stops information but also conveys information about the state’s capacity. Beyond its contribution to research on censorship, this article also sheds light on a relatively under-studied area in the literature on the authoritarian information problem. Previous studies on the problem of information paucity in authoritarian regimes focus on the autocrats’ side of the story, namely the dictator’s dilemma. While the lack of genuine information poses challenges for autocrats to maintain power, the lack of genuine information due to autocrats’ manipulation also challenges citizens to seek credible signals of the regime’s strength and decide how they should interact with the authority. Although this study provides no evidence that autocrats intentionally use censorship for signaling purposes, it does provide evidence that citizens interpret censorship as a signal of strength and adjust their perception and behavior. This study on censorship offers a case where scholars can understand how citizens process information and make use of signals in a political environment where information is likely to be manipulated. It approaches the authoritarian information problem from the citizens’ perspective and serves as a basis for future research on this topic.

Author

• Shuyuan Shen, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign