Division and Connection: How Does Networking Sway Mobilization in Autocracy?

• In Event: Information Technology and Politics; Formal Theory; and American Political Thought Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Formal Theory Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

A large number of protests break out every day in autocracy with capacity. How do ordinary people act collectively in such situation? What roles do informal networks play in such mobilization? In states with both carrot and stick, one might wonder how ordinary people – deprived of opportunities, resources, and formal organizations – could engage in any forms of resistance, but out of desperation and impulse. Based on extensive fieldwork about workers' collective action in China, I develop a game theoretical model to show that networking by individuals can bridge the division among the masses and synchronize opinions across groups. The masses are divided in autocracy with capacity and face a trade-off when acting collectively. They need to mobilize as many as possible to pressure the authority while evading as much attention from the authority as possible before the mobilization. A distinct mode of collective action, the networked mobilization, emerges: a few initiators from each division of the masses plan the collective action among themselves to manage the risk of being exposed and upon reaching agreement, each of them mobilizes fellows within his or her sphere of influence to maximize the turnout. I show that the networked mobilization boosts the turnout in the equilibrium above the level that would be achieved if separate groups act spontaneously. Moreover, the model suggests that the effect of networking varies depending on how the opinions of groups in the masses are related and that the disparity of group sizes reduces the incentive of networking for initiators from the major group in the masses.

Author

• Yuequan Guo, University of Michigan