Legislative Calendar and Executive Orders

• In Event: Presidents and Executive Politics & Public Policy Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Presidents and Executive Politics Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Congressional discretion is recognized as a strong conditioning influence on executive orders, and by extension, presidential unilateralism. Yet, congressional discretion has been measured broadly--- for example, distinguishing unified government and divided government as the level of ideological congruence--- without incorporating more nuanced measures of legislative capacity such as the legislative calendar. We rectify this, assessing hypotheses about how a Congress's legislative calendar impacts the President's choice. Using a comprehensive dataset of Congressional legislative calendar from 1974 to 2019, we find that the president will issue more executive orders during months of more legislative days. We also find that the president will issue more executive orders during the transition period. Legislative capacity, in this case, the number of monthly legislative days, is a key element structuring the President's use of executive orders. This article deepens our understanding of the dynamics of separation‐of‐powers politics and the limits of executive power.

Author

• Fred Gui, University of Rochester