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After the outbreak of COVID-19 in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), both medical professionals and online patrols worked hard to contain the virus and sporadic ruptures of contestation via social media. Across major platforms such as WeChat, Weibo, and Zhihu, Chinese netizens engaged in protracted entanglement with state apparatuses of internet control. Two significant events galvanized and mobilized netizens to hold the Wuhan municipal and Hubei provincial governments accountable for the rapid spread of the virus. First, people called on the inability of the local authorities to inform residents about the severity of COVID-19. Second, the death of Dr. LI Wenliang turned into a social media fiasco. Netizens mourned the death of what they believed to be a whistle-blower who had been silenced by the communist regime.
These two events, by themselves, are not puzzling as social media have been long thought to be a place on which political contentions take place. However, almost the same group of people had sung praises in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) tune and lauded the extraordinary achievements of the regime before the outbreak of COVID-19. During the massive and extended celebrations of the PRC’s 70th Anniversary, the Chinese state pushed out a series of cultural products, including films and documentaries, commemorative coins and stamps, and a number of exhibitions to showcase CCP’s achievements. These celebrations culminated in a military parade and a civilian parade on Oct 1st, 2019. Concurrent with those celebrations, Chinese netizens expressed their gratitude towards the “motherland” as a myriad of praises were shared on social media.
In fewer than six months, the national binge spiraled into poignant criticisms of the local state along with an emergence of implacable state-society tensions. Against this backdrop, this paper asks the following questions: First, why was there a dramatic shift in opinion towards the state from cheerleaders to dissidents? While online contention was mainly targeted at the Wuhan and Hubei governments, the scope of netizens’ claims focuses on the nature of the regime that’s shared by both central and local authorities. Second, how do netizens express their discontent? To be specific, do they conform to or circumvent official discourses? Third, what do online contention and discourse inform us about the CCP’s legitimacy building and cultural governance? We acknowledge that the shift in opinions by the same groups of netizens could be due to the nature of events – from a celebrative and positive one to a frightening and negative one. However, we argue such an explanation seems too straight forward. Thus, we aim to figure out important and nuanced factors other than just a shifting of events.
We argue that this shift in opinions is indicative of two-way socialization in the Party-state’s legitimacy building process. Indeed, while netizens have bought into the official narratives of legitimacy building, they hold the Chinese government of the same standard and expect the same action as propagated by the state, especially on moral claims including benevolence, truth, improvement, and sincerity. Their actions often result in the central government to forcefully intervene and appease netizens’ grievances. We identified this pattern of two-way socialization in the state-society interaction over the outbreak of COVID-19, and especially the death of Dr. Li Wenliang. The unfortunate event unleashed a deluge of attacks on the Chinese government, both central and local, as netizens called on the central government to intervene and bring justice to the venerable doctor. Netizens reproached the local police force, who were curt in their management of the situation, and lamented the death of the whistle-blower. They fought strenuously for the rectification of Dr. Li’s reputation.
Two main hypotheses are tested in this paper. First, the Party-state has succeeded in socializing netizens into the vernaculars of its legitimacy building. Second, those that were socialized into the Party-state’s legitimacy building narrative, in turn, hold the Party-state accountable for those narratives.
This study is qualitative in nature – a combination of online ethnography and discourse analysis. Data has been collected across three major Chinese social media platforms – WeChat, Weibo (Sina Microblog), and Zhihu. We reviewed over 400 profiles and posts from the three aforementioned social media platforms. We further streamlined our selection by particularly focusing on two factors. First, those profiles that had shared and agreed with official narratives transmitted through the Party-state (official social media accounts from central and local governments and administrative organs) and its mouthpiece (official state media). Second, the sector factor we looked at concerned those who had posted something (positive or negative) on the Seventieth Anniversary Celebrations and COVID-19.