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Leaders and the military that serves them regularly have disagreements about the use of force—often publicly. U.S. presidents and their political advisors have long lamented the military’s ability to use its institutional leverage and public prestige to ‘box them in,’ pressuring civilian officials into selecting the military’s preferred policy. Drawing upon an elite sample of Filipino diplomats, this article presents the first experimental evidence on how such internal divisions shape observers’ perceptions of U.S. credibility, and capacity to deter. We identify two theoretical mechanisms that drive observers’ shifting calculations—audience and efficiency costs—and show how elite military cues in the wake of a presidential statement of resolve can either amplify, or undercut, its efficacy.