Who Blames Democracy for a Bad Economy?

• In Event: Backlash and Blame: Political Costs and Consequences

Abstract

Who blames democracy for a bad economy? Studies consistently found that citizens’ support for and satisfaction with democracy are negatively influenced by their perceptions of the economy (Cordero and Simón 2016; Muhtadi and Warburton 2020; Quaranta and Martini 2016). There are variations, of course. For example, citizens in richer countries tend to emphasize the political (civil liberties) aspects of democracy more than citizens in poorer countries, who tend to emphasize the economic benefits of democracy (Daoust and Nadeau 2020). Other contextual factors that moderate the connection between the economy and democratic support are regime transitions (Kilavuz and Sumaktoyo 2020; Robbins 2015) and economic inequality (Krieckhaus et al. 2014).

Notwithstanding the above, we still know relatively little about the individual characteristics that condition the relationship between the economy and democratic support. Who actually blames democracy for a deteriorating economy? Answering this question is essential to guard against the perception that a bad economy lowers support for democracy similarly across individuals. We argue that the effects of economic perceptions on individuals’ support for democracy depends to a large extent on their understanding and expectation of what democracy should deliver. If citizens equate democracy simply as instrument to achieve better living standards (Thomassen, 1995), their views on democracy will be more sensitive to fluctuations in the economy, vis-à-vis individuals who associate democracy with protection of civil liberties and rule of law. In other words, we explore the heterogeneity in individuals’ understanding of democracy to test the relationship between economic perceptions and support for democracy.

We support this argument with a cross-country analysis of the World Values Survey and a nationally representative survey experiment in the world’s third-largest democracy, Indonesia. Like many countries in Southeast Asia, Indonesian voters are more likely to think of democracy as good governance and policy outcomes (Pietsch et al. 2015), rather than as a system of checks and balances. First, using cross-country data, we regress support for democracy on perceptions of the economy, a dummy variable that indicates an emphasis on the economic dimension of democracy, and an interaction between the two, along with a set of standard control variables. The significance of our interaction effect provides support for our argument. Second, we fielded a nationally representative survey experiment in Indonesia with a 2x2 factorial design. We manipulated both the salient characteristic of democracy (no priority vs economic priority) and information of the economy (no information vs bad economy). We find that information on bad economic condition decreased respondents’ support for democracy, but only among those who were primed with the importance of the economic dimension of democracy.

Our findings contribute to the literature by highlighting the importance of variations in individual citizen’s understanding of democracy. At the same time, through our experimental design, we also highlight the malleability of this individual-level variable. Civic education and elite messaging that offer a more comprehensive view of democracy (as opposed to emphasizing its economic dimension) may mitigate erosion of democratic support in the midst of an economic crisis.

Authors

• Puspa D Amri, Sonoma State University

• Nathanael Gratias Sumaktoyo, National University of Singapore

• Burhanuddin Muhtadi, State Islamic University