The Electoral and Legislative Consequences of Congressional Partisanship

• In Event: Strategic and Tactical Legislative Coalitions

Abstract

What are the consequences of congressional partisanship? Within Congress, are strong partisans less effective lawmakers? At the ballot box, are they punished or rewarded for this sort of behavior? In this paper, we consider the electoral and legislative consequences of legislators’ partisanship. Using a novel measure of their partisan intensity, the time and effort they put into supporting their party or opposing the other side, we assess whether members are penalized in Congress or rewarded back home for their partisan behavior. Our results suggest that partisanship, or lack thereof, does not affect their legislative effectiveness or vote shares. This suggests that members embrace or avoid partisanship for reasons other than appealing to voters or working across the aisle.

Authors

• Jeremy Gelman, University of Nevada, Reno

• Steven Lloyd Wilson, University of Nevada, Reno