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Two Kinds of Polarization and Democratic Theory

Fri, October 1, 4:00 to 5:30pm PDT (4:00 to 5:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Polarization is on everyone’s lips but we often confuse two importantly different phenomena when we speak of increased polarization: extreme disagreement and animosity toward the opponent. Empirically oriented political scientists have helpfully distinguished between ideological and affective polarization (McCarty, Iyengar). What we miss is a normative evaluation of their differences from the perspective of democratic theory. In this paper, I view polarization with what Peter Strawson calls a participant attitude and from what Stephen Darwall calls the second-person standpoint, that is, as something mutually accountable persons do to one another for better or worse reasons. This approach enables us to assess the first form of polarization as a matter of disagreeing and the other form of polarization as a matter of relating. On this basis, the paper makes two main argument. First, “the problem of polarization” doesn’t concern acts of radical disagreement but, rather, how people treat disagreeing and different others. Second, we should approach so-called affective polarization, not as an irrational and automatic psychological response to external stimuli, but as part of the struggle for recognition, which can and should be assessed according to democratic principles of free and equal participation.

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