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Multiple overlapping international organizations often assume governance roles within states, creating regime complexes in which authority can be unclear, contested, and contradictory. While a growing body of literature examines the nature and function of regime complexes, we know relatively little about the “view from the bottom,” or how mass publics in such states understand regime complexes and allocate blame between different international organizations involved in the same country. Intriguingly, evidence suggests that public opinion in this regard can differ dramatically across countries. Among European Union member states that also received International Monetary Fund bailout packages since the global financial crisis, we can find some states like Greece and Cyprus where the mass public places more blame on the IMF than the EU for poor economic conditions. Yet, in others, such as Romania and Latvia, the mass public places huge amounts of blame on the EU for the economy and relatively little on the IMF. What explains this empirical puzzle and, more broadly, how the public apportions blame between different international organizations assuming governance roles in their country?
Drawing upon data from the European Electoral Study, the paper advances and tests a sequential theory to explain individual and aggregate patterns that centers on the interaction of previously established attitudes toward the EU with the specific nature of IMF involvement. Regime complexes tend to be created sequentially, with one institution following another. In turn, attitudes toward the EU are developed and tend to be sticky, but not immovable. Particular forms of involvement by the IMF may then deflect blame away from the EU and toward the IMF. We also use an original survey experiment in Greece to demonstrate that an alternative hypothesis, centering on exposure to scapegoating by populist politicians, holds little weight.
The paper advances research on international organization by providing a unique cross-national analysis of public opinion toward an international regime complex and, specifically, how blame apportioned toward one IO can mediate views of another IO. We also contribute to research on public opinion toward the EU. While the debt crisis in the Eurozone has reignited euroskepticism, we show that the EU can deflect some of this criticism when other IOs become involved in member states.