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Why are some trade agreements more salient than others? In this paper, I analyze societal lobbying over two concurrently negotiated mega-regional trade deals in the US: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). I argue that the disparities in salience and political mobilization over the two agreements can be understood through new-new trade theory and the politics of intra-industry trade. I show that firm heterogeneity in export status hamstrings lobbying by broad coalitions, such as labor unions and industry associations. Where inter-industry trade is higher, labor and industry groups anticipate heavy industry losses (or gains), and lobby intensively. Where intra-industry trade is higher, lobbying by individual firms predominates. This sheds light on the contoversies surrounding TPP and the more muted political response to TTIP.