Campaign Donations, Family Loyalty, and Kickbacks

• In Event: Campaign Finance in Developing Democracies

Abstract

What motivates citizens to donate to a political campaign? The literature has characterized donors as those who wish to receive a direct benefit from an elected official or as citizens who just want to express their affinity for a candidate through a donation. We argue that, in a context of weak parties and term limits, donation patterns over time should differ for both types of donors. Using a close election regression discontinuity design in a sample of Colombian municipalities, we find that donating to the winner of the mayoral race significantly reduces the probability of donating in the next election. Consistent with our theory, such an effect is larger for family members---a group of donors with strong expressive motivations---than for private donors. Moreover, unlike family member donors, private donors are more likely to receive public contracts when donating to an election winner and more likely to donate in the next election after receiving a public contract.

Authors

• Miguel R. Rueda, Emory University

• Nelson Alejandro Ruiz, University of Oxford