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Nuclear adversaries count on accurately identifying their opponent’s nuclear strategy, that is, when in conflict that adversary will consider nuclear employment. They formulate their own strategy based on this interpretation, by sharpening declaratory strategy and developing capabilities that can deter the adversary action they most fear. But what if their interpretations are wrong? The United States is now pursuing new, low-yield nuclear weapons to deter Russian limited nuclear use. Yet, if Russia is not tempted to risk nuclear war over limited territorial gains, then these policies may instead trigger counterproductive and escalatory dynamics. New U.S. nuclear capabilities will likely exacerbate the Russian security dilemma and make Moscow more convinced that Washington seeks escalation dominance. Russia will thus intensify efforts to signal its ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the United States, reinforcing U.S. views of its lowered nuclear threshold and incentivizing increased deterrent measures. This cyclical dynamic may increase the likelihood of deterrence failure and the nuclear escalation of conventional conflict.