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What explains why some governments recognize minority languages – i.e., allow them to be taught formally in schools and to be used in mass media – while others do not? Conventional wisdom would suggest government ideologies and structural factors. In this paper I shift the focus and call attention to political regimes. I formally model minority language policies as the product of strategic bargaining between three actors: the head of government, the minority faction in the opposition, and the minority faction joining or allying with the government. Specifically, I demonstrate language policies made in democracies and absolute monarchies are more likely to recognize minority languages than military regimes. To test the propositions, I process-trace the political developments in Taiwan (1683-2019) – a case that exhibits the full range of regime types and minority language policies.