Saving the Internet: When is Outside Lobbying by Digital Platforms Successful?

• In Event: Internet Policy and Governance

Abstract

Platform power was recently identified as a new type of business power. Rooted in the infrastructural role of digital intermediaries, it is believed to operate through an alignment of preferences between users and platforms: Policymakers, anticipating a public outcry of users who fear restrictions of services that form the backbone of their social and economic activities, shy away from regulation (Culpepper and Thelen 2019). However, assuming that aligned preferences “largely automatic[ally]” (Culpepper and Thelen 2019, 6) translate into political influence risks to repeat the neglect of agency by the business power literature. How online platforms strategically mobilize their users for political purposes and under what conditions they are successful in doing so, thus, requires further investigation. Linking the platform power debate to outside lobbying (Kollman 1998), I argue that digital intermediaries have unique means to activate public support in order to signal electoral consequences to legislators. In contrast to traditional interest groups which have to actively build and maintain channels to access potential supporters, these channels are built-in in the platform business model. Because they own networks and take the role of intermediaries within them, they have direct and frequent access to dependent users. Platforms can not only use this channel to disseminate information and coordinate political action. They can also utilize their role as information gatekeepers (Laidlaw 2010) to widen the group of supporters through framing, i.e. emphasizing certain dimensions of a multidimensional issue “to promote a particular problem definition” (Entman 1993, 52).

To test my argument and establish its scope conditions, I compare two cases of intellectual property (IP) right reform using theory-testing process tracing and quantitative text analysis (QTA). In addition to collecting data through interviews with policymakers, lobbyists, and members of the business community, a QTA is conducted to track the spread of frames over time. To do so, a dictionary is built from platforms’ and right-holders’ public statements referring to the legislation and applied to a corpus of newspaper articles and tweets.

The policy of IP rights is chosen, because the advent of digital technologies introduced new means of reproducing and distributing content, leading to a renegotiation of entrenched policy compromises. In particular, the issue of intermediary liability – whether platforms are responsible for IP infringements of their users – pitted the interests of right-holders and online platforms against each other. Taking up the issue in 2011, the US Congress proposed the Protect IP Act (PIPA) and the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA). Initially, the bills enjoyed bipartisan support and in the rare cases they were discussed in newspapers or on Twitter, the discussions focused on the economic harm done by criminals through IP theft or counterfeiting. This changed, however, when platforms blacked out their services behind banners that informed users about the acts, framed them as censoring free speech, and urged users to contact their representatives. The successful attempts of platforms to (1) raise issue salience, (2) broaden support for their position, (3) reframe the issue, and (4) encourage users to take action resulted in a strong signal to policymakers and the acts’ failure.
In contrast, the EU Copyright Directive passed in 2019 despite proposing increased intermediary liability and similar attempts by platforms to mobilize users. Studying this deviant case in a paired comparison to the typical case of SOPA/PIPA allows uncovering the scope conditions of the mechanism by tracing it until it breaks down (Beach and Pedersen 2016). Existing studies suggest that the strength of frames, initial user preferences, an insufficient reach of the opposing coalition, and institutional factors that insulate legislators from public pressure may interfere with the mechanism.

Studying how and when platforms use outside lobbying successfully sheds light on one of their tactics currently employed in regulatory battles around the world. Further research can draw on this by investigating the interactions between platform’s inside and outside lobbying strategies.

References:
Beach, D., and R.B. Pedersen. 2016. “Selecting Appropriate Cases When Tracing Causal Mechanisms.” Sociological Methods & Research 47(4): 837–71.

Culpepper, P.D., and K. Thelen. 2019. “Are We All Amazon Primed? Consumers and the Politics of Platform Power.” Comparative Political Studies. Online First.

Entman, R.M. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 43(4): 51–58.

Kollman, K. 1998. Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies. Princeton University Press.

Laidlaw, E.B. 2010. “A Framework for Identifying Internet Information Gatekeepers.” International Review of Law, Computers & Technology 24(3): 263–76.

Author

• Michael Kemmerling, University of Cologne/Max Planck Institute for the Studiy of Societies