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This paper revisits the peace settlements that terminated World War I to challenge prominent arguments about democratization, the democratic peace, and international cooperation. It examines the reparations and territorial components of the Versailles Treaty to show how the presence of democracy in states like the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the United States, and Poland was incompatible with the settlement terms designed to institutionalize peace in 1919 and 1921.
It begins by discussing how territorial settlements simultaneously constitute domestic and international political orders. This delineation of sovereign boundaries is a strategically significant act of political exclusion. It necessarily deprives a large proportion of the global population of the formal right to participate directly in any domestic political process to select policy outcomes or institutional arrangements of a state. Rather though than creating an isolated political community, this act of exclusion embeds a domestic political order within a larger global complex of interests and institutions. Most importantly, these restrictions on political membership in a state help constitute the political order of that state in at least four ways—by constituting the interests of the remaining domestic groups; by setting the configuration of interests held by all domestic groups; by influencing domestic coalitional arrangements and the collective or “national” interests the resulting governments pursue; and by influencing the content of policy outcomes and domestic institutions.
This paper illustrates these claims by discussing how the territorial clauses of Versailles altered the demographic composition of Germany and Poland. In particular, the settlement terms constituted the political interests of conservative parties that later sought to undo democratic institutions in these respective countries. In the case of Germany, conservatives sought to displace the Weimar coalition and democracy in Germany as a mechanism to revise the Versailles Treaty.
The second portion of the paper shows how the political conflict over reparations reflected a deeper distributional struggle over how the costs of World War I should be distributed within and among states. Great Britain, France, and the United States used reparations to solve their internal commitment problem over the distributional costs of democracy, aggravated by the war and growing demand from the political left for progressive fiscal policies that relied more on the wealth of those supporting the political right. By creating economic and political pressure for fiscal austerity, the reparation clauses contributed to the Great Depression and worsened the same distributional conflict and commitment problem between the political right and left in Germany. The interwar settlement collapsed because democracy in Great Britain, France, and the United States was institutionally incompatible with democracy in Germany.
More broadly, this paper rethinks the traditional separation between domestic and international political orders, casting them instead as mutually constituted. This implies that the presence of internal institutional characteristics, such as democracy, always depends on the institutional content of the international order and vice versa.